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Bankruptcy—Conflicting Interests in Security—Status of Miller Act
Surety.—Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co. 1—A contractor entered into a
contract with the United States to perform certain work on the St. Lawrence
Seaway project. Respondent surety executed the two bonds required of the
contractor by the Miller Act,2
 one to guarantee performance of the contract
and the other to guarantee payment to laborers and materialmen. As part of
the surety agreement, the contractor assigned all its rights arising out of the
contract to the surety, conditional on default by the contractor. Pursuant to
the terms of the contract, the United States retained certain percentages of
estimated amounts due monthly to the contractor, which were to be paid to
the contractor upon final completion and acceptance. The contractor en-
countered financial trouble, the contract was terminated, and the work was
completed by another contractor. The surety was compelled to pay about
$350,000 to laborers and materialmen under the payment bond. After final
acceptance and payment, the United States still held nearly $88,000 in re-
tained percentages which would have been due and owing the original con-
tractor had it carried out its obligation to pay laborers and materialmen.
This fund was turned over to the now bankrupt contractor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy, whereupon the surety filed a petition alleging ownership of the fund
and seeking an order directing the trustee to pay it over to the surety. The
referee ruled that the surety had no superior rights in the fund but must
share equally with general creditors. The District Court for the Western
District of New York reversed the referee, granting the surety a priority over
general creditors.a This decision was affirmed by both the Second Circuit 4
and the Supreme Court. HELD: A surety has a right by way of subrogation
to such a fund. The Government had a right to use the retained fund to pay
laborers and materialmen; the laborers and materialmen had a right to be
paid out of the fund; the contractor, had he completed his job and paid his
laborers and materialmen, would have become entitled to the fund; and the
surety, having paid the laborers and materialmen, is entitled to the benefit of
all these rights to the extent necessary to reimburse it.
Certiorari was granted in an attempt to clarify conflicting holdings with
respect to the surety's rights in such a fund. Most courts have granted the
surety, who met his obligation under either the performance or payment bond,
a priority over the rights of the defaulting contractor's trustee in bankruptcy
and creditors having conflicting security interests in the same contract rights'
371 U.S. 132 (1962).
2 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1958).
3 In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1961). The referee's
ruling is reported in 35 Ref. J. 81 (1961).
4 In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 298 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962), noted, 61 Mich. L. Rev.
402 (1962).
5 See Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937) ; Belknap Hardware & Mfg.
Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144 (6th Cir. 1921) ; In re Cummins Constr.
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1948) ; National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp.
381 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 350 U.S.
902 (1955) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950) ; United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226
(1947).
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However, recent decisions in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 8 have denied that
sureties have a prior claim to retained percentages by mere payment to
laborers and materialmen. These cases have relied on the following dictum in
United States v. Munsey Trust Co.: 7
But nothing is more clear than that laborers and materialmen
do not have enforceable rights against the United States for their
compensation. . . . They cannot acquire a lien on public buildings
. . and as a substitute for that more customary protection, the
various statutes were passed which require that a surety guarantee
their payment.
[I] t is elementary that one cannot acquire by subrogation
what another whose rights he claims did not have. 8
In fact, the question of the surety's right to subrogation was not in issue
in the Munsey case. Rather, that case decided that the United States had
the right to set off its own claim against the contractor out of the retained
fund. When the instant case was before the Second Circuit, that court inter-
preted the Munsey dictum as follows:
[W]e think the quotations from Munsey in the opinions in
Phoenix and Hinds0
 have been misconstrued. If the Supreme Court
intended to make any comment with respect to the situation now
before us, it was merely to say that they held the point open for
decision in the future. Of course, if the surety failed to pay ma-
terialmen and laborers, the surety 'would have done nothing to earn
subrogation.' Moreover, the fact that 'laborers and materialmen
have no enforceable rights against the United States,' 260 F.2d at
page 368, is beside the point. The question is not whether the
laborers and materialmen have rights enforceable against the
Government, but whether they have an equitable priority in the
retained payments. 1° (Footnotes and emphasis supplied.)
See American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Phoenix Indem.
Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955). But cf. United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d
862 (10th Cir. 1960).
7 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
B Id. at 241-42.
9 Supra note 6.
10 Supra note 4, at 658. See also National Sur. Co. v. United States, supra note 5,
at 384, where the court states:
In United States v. Munsey Trust Co. . . the Supreme Court said that
the United States was not legally liable to laborers and materialmen, but it did
not say that laborers and materialmen could not assert an equitable claim to
moneys in the hands of the United States payable under the contract. We think
they can. To permit them to do so in no way interferes with the full exercise
of the sovereign powers of the United States. It does not subject the .. .
[United States] to liability beyond the amount it has in its hands confessedly
due and owing to somebody.
Other courts have held that the Munsey decision is limited to situations in which the
United States is more than a mere stakeholder. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Triborough Bridge Authority and In re Cummins Constr. Corp., supra note 9. The
Supreme Court in Munsey stated (332 U.S, at 240):
From Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 [18961, to American
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The majority of the Supreme Court in Pearlman, relying on Prairie
State Bank v. United Statesn and Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. 12
 for the principle that "there is a security interest in a withheld fund
like this to which the surety is subrogated,"la decided either expressly or by
necessary implication that laborers and materialmen have at least an equi-
table right to be paid out of such retained percentages held by the United
States as a mere stakeholder, and that the surety is entitled to that right
after it has paid the laborers and materialmen. The surety is therefore given
an equitable lien on retained percentages which has priority over the claims
of the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy and general creditors."
A proper understanding of the issues involved in the case requires a
consideration of traditional suretyship law, At common law, a surety who
has been compelled to complete performance of a contract or to pay laborers
and materialmen has several distinct remedies available. He has a direct
right against the principal debtor for indemnity or reimbursement. This
Surety Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269 (19461, we have recognized the peculiarly
equitable claim of those responsible for the physical completion of building con-
tracts to be paid from available moneys ahead of others whose claims come
from the advance of money. But in all those cases, the owner was a mere stake-
holder and had no rights of its own to assert. (Emphasis supplied.)
11
 164 U.S. 227 (1896). The surety in this case had been compelled, under a per-
formance bond, to complete a government contract after the contractor's default. The
Court held that the percentages retained by the United States could be used by it to
protect itself and that the surety, by asserting the right of subrogation, could protect
itself out of the fund by resort to the same securities and remedies which had been
available to the United States for its protection against the contractor.
12
 208 U.S. 404 (1908). Here the surety had paid laborers and materialmen under
a combination performance and payment bond. The Court held that the same equitable
principles as in the Prairie State Bank case operated to entitle the surety to subrogation
to any right of the United States Government arising through the building contract.
13
 Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., supra note 1, at 137.
14 Counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy in the Pearlman case apparently relied on
both §§ 70a and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 110a & c (1958), although this is by no means clear from the opinion. The Court's
only reference to § 70 is at 83 Sup. Ct. 233 where the Court states that the Government
turned the fund over to the trustee "who held it on the assumption that it had been prop-
erty of the bankrupt at the time of adjudication and therefore had vested in the trustee
`by operation of law' under § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act." It is possible to construe the
Court's opinion as based on the exceedingly narrow ground that the fund never vested
in the trustee under § 70a, leaving for future determination the question whether or not
the trustee had any superior rights under § 70c, which provides:
The trustee, as to all property . . . upon which a creditor of the bankrupt
could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bank-
ruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or
not such a creditor actually exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, it is inconceivable that the several courts which considered this contro-
versy on the petition of the surety after numerous arguments of eminently qualified
counsel would have deprived the trustee of the fund in its possession on so narrow a
ground without full consideration of the trustee's rights. Note that at the argument
before the Second Circuit two amicus curiae briefs were submitted in support of the
trustee's contentions in addition to the brief of the trustee's counsel. Since no issue was
made of this point and since the Court cited § 70, it is submitted that all of the trustee's
rights under that section, including § 70c, were considered.
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remedy is purely equitable and is similar to restitution." The surety also
has a right of subrogation to all the rights of laborers, materialmen or other
creditors of the principal debtor that the surety has been compelled to pay
under the suretyship agreement. This right is also equitable and may involve
the right to recover under the creditor's contract with the principal, the right
to enforce liens of the creditor, including statutory mechanic's liens, or other
remedies. A different right exists where, as in the instant case, the surety has
received as part of the suretyship agreement an assignment of all the princi-
pal's rights under its contract with a third party, here, the Government. Such
an assignment gives the surety the legal right, in the event of the principal's
default, to receive all sums due and owing under the contract to the extent of
all payments made under the bond and any expenses incurred in completing
the contract. Finally, the surety also has certain rights prior to making any
payments under the suretyship agreement. These include the equitable right
of exoneration which enables the surety to bring suit against the principal
and obtain an order directing the principal to pay the creditors to whom the
surety is liable on the bond. A right of reverse exoneration has been recog-
nized in some states, by statute or judicial decision, which enables the surety,
by bringing suit against the creditor, to force the creditor to sue the principal
debtor to enforce payment of the debt on which the surety is liable, thus
reducing the surety's risk."
The majority opinion appears to have confused these various remedies,
lumping them together, discussing reimbursement as though it were the
same as subrogation," and not mentioning the surety's rights under the
assignment from the contractor. The opinion cites the Prairie State Bank and
Henningsen opinions for the proposition that the surety is subrogated to the
rights of the United States in such a retained fund and then concludes that
the surety is subrogated to the rights of laborers and materialmen and that
they have a right to the fund, citing Martin v. National Sur. Co.'s as reaching
a similar result.
As stated in the minority concurring opinion in the instant case, the
Martin case did not reach such a broad conclusion. In that action the surety,
which became insolvent during the proceedings, brought a suit in the nature
of exoneration against an assignee of certain funds of the contractor. The
assignee took his assignment with knowledge of a prior assignment to the
15 The right to reimbursement is one of the major differences between a surety
contract and an insurance contract.
is This is the "Doctrine of Pain v. Packard," 13 Johns. R. (N.Y.) 174 (1816). See
generally Simpson, Suretyship 165-253 (1950).
17 See 371 U.S. at 136, 137, where the Court states that the question is
whether the surety had, as it claimed, ownership of, an equitable lien on, or a
prior right to this fund before bankruptcy adjudication.
. . . Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their principal have
been deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without a contractual promise such
as the surety here had [citing a footnote which states, "The right of subroga-
tion is not founded on contract.l. And probably there are few doctrines better
established than that a surety who pays the debt of another is entitled to all
the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be reimbursed ... gen-
erally known as the right of subrogation. (Emphasis supplied.)
is 300 U.S. 588 (1937), affirming, 85 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1936).
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surety. The purpose of the suit was to protect laborers and materialmen to
whom the surety was obligated under the bond. On the surety's becoming
insolvent, it renounced all its rights in the fund in favor of the laborers and
materialmen. The Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Cardozo,
merely held that the laborers and materialmen were entitled to the fund by
virtue of the prior assignment to the surety. It declined to rule on the Eighth
Circuit's holding in the same case that the proceeds of a building contract
are chargeable with an equitable lien in favor of laborers and materialmen,
the proposition for which the majority opinion in the instant case cited it.
In the concurring opinion in Pearlman, three justices took the view that
the majority had given laborers and materialmen rights against the Govern-
ment which "might jeopardize the rights of the United States and have serious
consequences for its building operations." 19 Exactly what these rights might
be is by no means clear, especially since the majority opinion merely gives
the laborers and materialmen equitable rights in a fund held by the United
States as a stakeholder. If the United States is more than a stakeholder, as in
Munsey, then certainly different rules apply as that case demonstrates. The
minority opinion clarifies the Prairie State Bank and Henningsen decisions,
which held that the surety should be subrogated to the rights of the United
States rather than to the rights of laborers and materialmen. Such a holding
would permit a similar recovery by the surety on the theory that the United
States has a right to use retained percentages to pay laborers and material-
men; the surety has paid them; and, being subrogated to the rights of the
United States, can reimburse itself out of the fund to the extent of such pay-
ments. However, the minority opinion, citing the Martin case for its actual
holding, concluded that the surety's rights to the fund should be determined
on the basis of its contract with the contractor. Since under the contract all
sums due to the contractor after default "were assigned to the surety to be
credited against any loss or damage it might suffer thereby,"2° the surety
could recover the entire fund without the necessity of deciding whether or not
the laborers and materialmen had rights against the United States, an equitable
lien on retained percentages, or any of the many other factors which caused
so much confusion in the majority opinion. It is submitted that this is the
better basis for the Court's decision.
The Court expressly limits its decision to a situation where "there is no
statute which expressly declares that a surety does acquire a property interest
in a fund like this under the circumstances here." 2 ' The case having been
decided in a jurisdiction in which the Uniform Commercial Code is not yet
in effect,22
 the question arises whether the Code will have any effect upon the
surety's rights. Two recent Pennsylvania decisions under the Code have re-
jected the claims of sureties to prior interests in retained percentages under
government contracts. In United States ex rel. Greer v. Fleetwood & Co.,23
the court ordered the retained percentages paid over to a bankrupt subcon-
19 Supra note I, at 142.
20
 Id. at 143.
21 Id. at 136.
22 The Uniform Commercial Code will become effective in New York September
27, 1964.
23
 165 F. Stipp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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tractor's trustee in bankruptcy, denying that the surety on a performance
bond had prior rights in the fund since it had not complied with the filing
requirement of UCC section 9-302 (1). The court stated that the surety,
"therefore, must be relegated to the stature of a general creditor." 24 The
court did not discuss the possibility of other rights of the surety such as subro-
gation. This decision seems to reject completely the holding in the Prairie
State Bank case. 25
In Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. School Bldg. Authority,26
the contractor had assigned all its accounts receivable, present and future, to a
bank in exchange for financing. The bank filed a financing statement, thus
"perfecting" its security interest under the Code:27 After default by the con-
tractor, the surety also filed a financing statement. In denying the surety's
claim to priority, the court's reasoning indicates that the bank, having filed
first, was entitled to priority, and that the surety, by filing, in effect, waived
its admitted rights to subrogation.
It would seem that these courts were correct in treating the interest of
the surety under the assignment from the contractor as a "Security Interest"
governed by Article 9 of the Code. The assignment is intended to secure
reimbursement to the surety in case the contractor defaults, and is therefore
intended to create a security interest under UCC section 9-102(1), which
brings the interest within the scope of Article 9. 28 Under the Code, the
surety, by taking certain steps, 29 can insure that it has an enforceable legal
24 Id. at 725.
25 Supra note 11.
26 26 Pa. D. & C. 2d 717 (1961), annotated in, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 123
(1962).
27
 See UCC §§ 9-204(1), 9-302(1).
28 UCC § 9-102(2) states, "This Article applies to security interests created by
contract including ... assignment . . . ." Comment 1 to this section states:
Except for sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel paper, the principal
test whether a transaction comes under this Article is: is the transaction in-
tended to have effect as security?
UCC § 1-201(37) defines "Security Interest" as "an interest in personal property or fix-
tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
The assignment to the surety is conditional and does not become enforceable unless
and until the contractor defaults, at which time the surety's obligation of performance
and/or payment to laborers and materialmen also becomes unconditional. There is
nothing in Article 9 that excludes security transactions merely because they are con-
ditional.
29 The required steps are described in Coogan, How to Create Security Interests
Under the Code—And Why, 48 Cornell L.Q. 131 (1962), which contains an excellent
treatment of the subject. The steps are as follows:
(1) There must be agreement that the security interest attach;
(2) Value must be given. "Value" is defined in UCC § 1-201(44), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and
bank collections . . . a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit . . . ;
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract.
Such value is given by the surety on the date the surety contract is executed;
(3) The debtor (contractor) must have rights in the collateral. This requirement
is fulfilled on the date of execution of the government contract.
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security interest which will have priority over the trustee in bankruptcy of a
defaulting contractor and over nearly all the other creditors claiming security
interests in the same collatera1.80
 If the surety files a financing statement31
at or before the time the surety contract is executed, its security interest will
have priority over the trustee in bankruptcy, 32 and over any secured creditor
having a security interest in the same collateral who filed a financing state-
ment at a later time. The only conceivable situation in which a prior security
interest could exist is if the contractor had previously assigned his future
contract rights under a continuing financing arrangement and if a proper
financing statement had been filed at an earlier date. This could be ascer-
tained by the surety by checking the filing records. If such a prior interest
existed, the surety could still take steps to protect itself in case of default.
For example, it could obtain an agreement from the bank that the surety's
claim would have priority, or an agreement establishing pro rata distribution
between the bank and the surety, or by simply charging a higher surety
premium before undertaking the bond obligation.
What effect, then, will the Code have on the surety's other rights, es-
pecially that of subrogation? It is conceivable that the Supreme Court could
rule that the surety's right of subrogation is superior to any other conflicting
interest regardless of how created. Certainly, the Pearlman case does not
support that result, as the majority opinion gives the surety an equitable lien
only. Moreover, such a result would conflict with the Government's policy
of encouraging small contractors to undertake government work. 33
 A second
When these three steps are satisfied, the security interest "attaches" under UCC
§ 9-204(1).
(4) The surety must file a "financing statement," required by UCC 9-302(1) to
perfect a security interest in such collateral if it represents a significant part of the as-
signor's contract rights.
Upon completion of these four steps, the security interest is "perfected" under UCC
§ 9-303(1).
(5) Finally, the security agreement must be in writing, signed by the debtor, and
contain a description of the collateral.
See Coogan, supra at 139, where the author states:
As a minimum, one must think not in terms of the three steps that cause
a security interest to attach nor even of the four steps that cause it to be per-
fected, but in terms of at least the five steps necessary to create a perfected and
enforceable security interest—namely, compliance with the provisions of 9-203,
9-204, and 9-303.
See also Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1963).
30
 The most important of the steps in point of time is the requirement of filing.
UCC § 9-312(5) provides that as to conflicting security interests perfected by filing,
order of filing governs priority, and not order of perfection.
31 See supra note 29, step (4).
32 UCC § 9-301 gives the trustee in bankruptcy priority over an unperfected secu-
rity interest. See Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1963), where the author states:
The inferences to be drawn from ... MCC § 9-301(1) (b)] are that an
unperfected security interest is good against a lien creditor with knowledge, and
a perfected security interest is good whether or not the subsequent lien creditor
has knowledge.
See Bankruptcy Act § 70c, quoted supra note 14.
33 This policy is evidenced by the Federal Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, 54
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alternative would be to rule that the surety can elect to stand on his rights
of subrogation; or to file a financing statement, thereby waiving his rights of
subrogation, as held in the Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. case, and electing to
stand on his legal rights under the Code. A third alternative, and one with
much to commend it, is for the court to hold that there is no need to look
beyond the statute to determine the surety's right. The Code has provided
an adequate legal remedy by which sureties, by following proper procedures,
can establish legal security interests having absolute priority over the trustee
in bankruptcy and almost certain priority over all other creditors of the de-
faulting contractor. It would seem that the "equitable subrogation" doctrine,
designed to provide the surety with a remedy where none was previously
provided by common law or statute, is superfluous. 1'
The Pearlman case provides an uncertain basis for granting the surety
"equitable subrogation" in retained percentages which the United States
holds as a stakeholder in jurisdictions in which the Uniform Commercial Code
is not in effect. In Code jurisdictions, no reason is apparent why the "equi-
table subrogation" doctrine should not be abandoned.
FORREST W. BARNES
Communications—FCC—Unfair Competition by Community Antenna
Service.—Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. 1—In an action commenced on
antitrust grounds by a community antenna operator, the defendant, a local
television station, filed a compulsory counter-claim and applied for a pre-
liminary injunction against plaintiffs. The defendant station alleged that it
had exclusive contract rights to the "first run" of major network programs in
the Twin Falls, Idaho area. It further alleged that the activities of the plaintiff
community antenna operator, in picking up and distributing these programs
to its subscribers at the same time they were broadcast by the station, con-
stituted tortious interference with these contract rights and was a means of
unfair competition. HELD: The contractual arrangements made by the local
station with the television networks which granted the limited right of first
call exclusively upon the programs of the latter is a valuable property right,
protectable by injunction from the tortious interference and unfair compe-
Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958), which authorizes the assignment
of the contractor's contract claims against the Government to a bank or other financial
institution as security for the extension of the financing necessary to enable small con-
tractors to undertake government contracts. Such assignments were previously null and
void as against the United States. Financing institutions would be increasingly reluctant
to extend such credit if the major source of security in the event of default and bank-
ruptcy of the contractor, i.e., the retained percentages, is held to belong to the surety
regardless of whether it has taken the steps necessary to perfect its interest, which would
have served to put the bank on notice of that interest.
84 A similar policy is found in the analogous provisions dealing with "preferred
creditors" in Bankruptcy Act, § 60a(6), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
96a (6) (1958), which provides: "The recognition of equitable liens where available means
of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is declared to be contrary to the policy of
this section."
211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962).
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